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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
In September of 2012 Appellant DNJ, Inc. (DNJ) purchased a 2012 Krone Big X 1100 
Forage Chopper (Krone Chopper) from Respondent Krone NA, Inc. (Krone), the manufacturer 
and owner of the Krone Chopper. This purchase was facilitated by Respondent Burks Tractor 
Company, Inc. (Burks), a Krone dealership. As part of the purchase, the Krone Chopper was 
covered by Krone's New Equipment Limited Warranty (Limited Warranty), and DNJ also 
purchased a Krone North America Crown Guarantee (Extended WaITanty). On October 15, 
2012, the Krone Chopper was destroyed by fire. Appellant Western Community Insurance 
Company (Western Community), DNJ's insurer, covered the loss and filed a subrogation action 
against Krone and Burks. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Western Community filed its original Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on July 22, 
2014, alleging breaches of express warranty and of the obligation of good faith against Krone, as 
well as violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA), Idaho Code § 48-603(5) and 
-603(7), against Krone and Burks. R. Vol. I, pp. 18-26. Burks and Krone appeared, and on 
October 4, 2014, Krone filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 12(b)(6). R. Vol. I, p. 3. Burks filed its Answer to Complaint, Cross-Claim, and Demand 
for Jury Trial on October 23, 2014, and its own Motion to Dismiss on October 27, 2014. Id. at 
pp. 27-36, 3. 
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Judgment dismissing the ICPA claims against Burks, with prejudice, was entered on 
December 29, 2014. Id. at pp. 41-42. A Partial Judgment, dismissing Western Community's 
breach of Limited Warranty, breach of the obligation of good faith regarding the Limited 
Warranty, and ICPA claims against .K..rone, was entered on December 31, 2014. Id. at pp. 43-44. 
Western Community filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 12, 2015, seeking to modify 
the Burks Judgment to a dismissal without prejudice. Id. at 5. On January 21, 2015, Western 
Community filed a Motion to Amend Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, seeking to file a 
First Amended Complaint that would add DNJ as a plaintiff on all four original claims, add 
Burks as a defendant on the breach of express warranty and breach of good faith claims, and 
revive the ICP A claims against Burks and Krone. Id. at 51-61. 1 
On April 21, 2015, the district court's Memorandum and Order Re: Motion for 
Reconsideration was entered, modifying the Burks Judgment of Dismissal to one without 
prejudice. Id. at 45-50. On May 5, 2015, the district court's Memorandum and Order Re: 
Motion to Amend Complaint was entered, allowing DNJ to be joined as a co-plaintiff and Burks 
as a co-defendant on the first two claims, but denying the proposed reintroduction of the portions 
of the first two claims related to Krone's alleged breach of the Limited Warranty and breach of 
the obligation of good faith with regard to that warranty. Id. at 51-61. The district court's 
Memorandum and Order also denied the re-pleading of the dismissed ICPA claims. Id. 
1 The record is unclear as to whether the proposed First Amended Complaint was ever filed. Western Community, 
DNJ, and the only remaining defendant, Krone, stipulated to the filing, which the district court approved of on 
February 2, 2015. R. Vol. I, p. 6. Krone subsequently filed a motion to strike portions of the First Amended 
Complaint, as well as a motion to dismiss it in the entirety. Id. This motion practice, however, followed Western 
Community and DNJ's Motion to Amend of January 21, 2015, and preceded the district court's ruling on that 
original motion on April 21, 2015. 
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On May 20, 2015, Western Community and DNJ filed a Second Amended Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial. Id. at 65-84. This ultimately met with Krone and Burks' joint Motion 
for Summary Judgment, later withdrawn. Id. at 7-8. 
On DPr.PmbPr 17, ?01 \ Western f:ommnnity ;:incl DNJ filPrl ;:i Thirrl AmPnrlPrl f:omphiint 
and Demand for Jury Trial (Third Amended Complaint), alleging two causes of action against 
Krone and Burks, breach of express warranties and breach of the obligation of good faith. Id. at 
115-35.2 Notably, Western Community and DNJ alleged in the Third Amended Complaint that 
Krone was the owner of the Krone Chopper when it was sold to DNJ. Id. at p. 116, ,i VIII ("The 
Krone Chopper was manufactured and owned by Krone NA and was sold to DNJ on its behalf 
by Burks."); p. 117, ,i IX ("At the time of its purchase of the Krone Chopper from Krone NA, 
Krone NA as the manufacturer/owner .... "). On March 29, 2016 Burks filed its Answer to 
Third Amended Complaint, Cross-Claim, and Demand for Jury Trial. Id. at 136-44. Burks 
admitted the allegations contained in the Third Amended Complaint regarding Krone's 
ownership of the Krone Chopper at the time it was sold to DNJ. Id. at 137, ,i 5 ("With regard to 
Paragraph VIII of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, Burks admits each and every allegation 
contained therein."); ,i 6 ("With regard to Paragraphs IX and X of Plaintiffs' Third Amended 
Complaint, Burks admits that Krone NA was the manufacturer/owner of the Krone 
Chopper .... "). On March 31, 2016, Krone filed its Answer to Plaintiffs' Third Amended 
2 There is nothing in the record indicating that Western Community or DNJ sought or received "leave of court 
or ... written consent of the adverse party" to file the Third Amended Complaint, as required by.former Idaho Rules 
o.f Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a). Krone's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint, filed February 2, 
2016, was based, in part, on this deficiency. R. Vol. I, p. 10. 
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Complaint, also admitting Krone's ownership of the Krone Chopper when it was sold to DNJ. 
Id. at 162, ~ 8 ("Defendant Krone admits the allegations contained in paragraph VIII."). 
The four-day jury trial began on April 5, 2016. At the close of Western Community and 
DNJ's case-in-chief, Burks moved for a directed verdict as to all remaining warranty claims 
against Burks, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(a), based on Burks' lack of 
ownership of the Krone Chopper at any point in the transfer of ownership from Krone to DNJ, 
and the concomitant lack of privity between Burks and DNJ. Tr. Vol. I, p. 779, L. 7-p. 796, 
L. 5. The district court granted Burks' motion. Tr. Vol. I, p. 800, L. 25-p. 802, L. 8. 
Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Krone and against Western Community and 
DNJ on all causes of action. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1095, L. 17-p. 1096, L. 25. 
On May 2, 2016, Western Community and DNJ filed a Motion for Reconsideration and 
New Trial. R. Vol. I, p. 15. On June 24, 2016, the district court issued its Memorandum 
Decision Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, denying the Motion. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 177-95. Western Community and DNJ filed a Notice of Appeal on July 8, 2016. 
C. Statement of Additional Facts 
The purchase of the Krone Chopper by DNJ from Krone included the Krone New 
Equipment Limited Warranty, and DNJ also purchased from Krone the Krone North America 
Crown Guarantee. The Limited Warranty warranted against "defects in material and 
workmanship." R. Vol. I, pp. 129-31. The Extended Warranty covered repair or replacement of 
certain paiis determined to have failed under certain types of mechanical breakdown or failure. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 133-35. 
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After the fire loss of the Krone Chopper, Krone determined that there was no defect in 
material or workmanship, but that an accumulation of debris was the cause of the fire. Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 725, L. 16-p. 726, L. 12. At end of trial, the jury answered special interrogatories regarding 
whether Krone breached either warranty or had violated the duty of good faith regarding the 
warranties. The jury found that Krone had not. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1096, LL. 1-25. 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the district court erred in not allowing Western Community to allege 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act in the proposed First Amended 
Complaint. 
II. Whether the district court erred in denying Appellants' motion for new trial. 
III. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether Burks is entitled to its attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rules, Rules 40 and 41; Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54; 
and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The district court correctly refused to allow Western Community to allege Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act (ICPA) claims in the proposed First Amended Complaint. 
1. Standard of review 
Under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a), after a responsive pleading has been 
filed, a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or the written consent of the adverse 
party. While leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, it remains at the 
discretion of the trial court. "The grant or denial of leave to amend after a responsive pleading 
has been filed is a matter that is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal 
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on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion." DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 
Idaho 749, 755, 331 P.3d 491, 497 (2014) (quoting Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. 
Idaho First Nat. Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991)). 
The test for whether a trial court has abused its discretion is three-fold: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it, and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id. at 755, 331 P.3d at 497 (quoting Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 
573, 903 P.2d 730, 738 (1995)). "The burden is on the person asserting error to show an abuse 
of discretion." Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 697, 378 P.3d 464, 487 (2016) (quoting Merrill 
v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 843, 87 P.3d 949, 952 (2004)). 
"In determining whether an amended complaint should be allowed, where leave of court 
is required under Rule 15( a), the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be 
inserted into the action by the amended complaint state a valid claim." Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club, 119 Idaho at 175, 804 P.2d at 904. 
2. The district court correctly perceived whether to grant or deny leave to 
amend Western Community's Complaint was within its discretion. 
After a responsive pleading has been filed, "a party may amend a pleading only by leave 
of court or by written consent of the adverse party .... " Former Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 15(a).3 The district court's decision to grant or deny leave to amend is one of 
discretion. See Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305-06 
(1977) (adopting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962)). Here, the 
3 While the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended since the actions taken in the underlying case, no 
substantive change was made with regard to Rule I 5(a). 
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district court recognized that the question was within its discretion, and explicitly noted such in 
its Memorandum and Order Re: Motion to Amend Complaint, entered May 5, 2015: "Although 
leave to amend should be freely given, the decision to grant or deny permission to amend is left 
to the sound discretion of the trial court." R. Vol. I, p. 53. 
3. The district court reached its decision to deny leave to amend by an exercise 
of reason. 
Having set forth that it recognized that the decision whether to allow Western 
Community leave to amend was within its discretion, the district court proceeded to analyze 
Western Community's arguments at length, considering each and coming to various conclusions. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 54-60. The district court "carefully read[]" Western Community's proposed First 
. Amended Complaint, considered the additional language Western Community proposed to add 
to bolster the pleading of its previously-dismissed ICPA claims against Burks, and explained 
why the district court found such addition to be insufficient. Id. at 58-59. The district court 
thereby reached its decision to deny leave to amend by an exercise of reason. 
4. In denying Western Community leave to amend its Complaint, the district 
court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. 
Western Community sought leave to amend the original Complaint in an attempt to 
remedy pleading deficiencies that had proven fatal to the third and fourth claims pied in the 
original Complaint.4 Specifically, the original Complaint contained ICPA claims against Krone 
and Burks alleging violation of Idaho Code § 48-603(5) and -603(7). R. Vol. I, pp. 23-25. 
4 Of note, the record on appeal contains neither A.ppellants' Motion to Amend Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, filed January 21, 2015, the denial of which is the basis for Appellants' first issue on appeal, nor Appellants' 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed concurrently 
therewith. 
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These claims, the only claims in the original Complaint against Burks, were dismissed by the 
district court on Burks' Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and Burks was 
dismissed from the case. R. Vol. I, pp. 41-42. When Western Community sought to amend the 
original Complaint so as to re-plead those claims, the district court denied the motion. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 54-61. The district court provided several reasons for having done so, each reason 
individually sufficient, each within the boundaries of the district court's discretion, and each 
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to the district 
court. Id. 
a. Western Community's proposed !CPA claims were not valid claims 
because there was no contractual relationship between Western 
Community and Burks, and thus Western Community lacked standing. 
"In order to have standing under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA), the 
aggrieved party must have been in a contractual relationship with the party alleged to have acted 
unfairly or deceptively." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d 642, 662 (2010) 
( citing Idaho Code § 48-608(1) ("Any person who purchases or leases goods or services and 
thereby suffers .... "); Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 788, 640 P.2d 1186, 1189 (Ct. App. 
1982) (holding "that a claim under the ICPA must be based upon a contract.")). 
It is undisputed that there was no contract between Western Community and Burks. DNJ 
purchased the Krone Chopper from Krone, the owner of the Krone Chopper, with Burks 
facilitating that purchase as a dealership. Tr. Vol. I., p. 576, LL. 12-22; R. Vol. I., pp. 116-17, 
~~ VIII, IX. Leaving aside, for the moment, the issue of whether Western Community could be 
subrogated to the statutory ICPA claims DNJ may have had against Krone (discussed below), 
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Burks and DNJ never entered into a contractual agreement with each other, and as such there 
was no valid ICPA claim for Western Community to subrogate. The contracts at issue-for the 
purchase of the Krone Chopper, and the two warranties-were solely between DNJ and Krone: 
Burks could not have sold the K_rone Chopper because Burks never held title to it, and Burks 
could not have entered into the warranty contracts with DNJ because those warranties were 
offered, sold, and administered by Krone. Id.; Tr. Vol. I., p. 576, L. 23-p. 577, L. 1. Without a 
contractual relationship, there can be no standing to bring an ICPA claim against Burks, whether 
by DNJ, Western Community, or otherwise. Hence, Appellants' position on appeal that Western 
Community was the subrogee to claims of DNJ is irrelevant: if DNJ, the actual purchaser, had 
no standing to bring an ICPA claim against Burks, such conclusion works doubly so against 
Western Community as DNJ's putative subrogee.5 
b. Western Community's proposed !CPA claims were not valid claims 
because a subrogee may not bring !CPA claims without the subrogor's 
express assignment, and thus Western Community lacked standing. 
Appellants argue that the district court erred in ruling that a subrogee lacks standing to 
sue under the ICP A absent an express agreement transferring those statutory rights from the 
insured to the insurance company subrogee. Apps.' Br., p. 6; R. Vol. I, p. 58. Appellants further 
argue that the district court erred in relying upon the holding of Trinity Universal Ins. Co. of 
Kan. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 176 Wash. App. 185, 312 P.3d 976 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) in arriving 
5 Appellants assign error to the fact that Western, rather than Western and DNJ as Appellants, was denied leave to 
amend to allege !CPA claims in the proposed First Amended Complaint. This specificity is presumably because by 
the time Appellants sought leave to amend, the applicable statute of limitations had run on any ICPA claim DNJ 
may have had. See Idaho Code§ 48-619 ("No private action may be brought under this act more than two (2) years 
after the cause of action accrues.") DNJ purchased the Krone Chopper on September 12, 2012, and it was destroyed 
by fire on October 15, 2012. Appellants filed their Motion to Amend Complaint on January 21, 2015 to add DNJ as 
a party plaintiff. 
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at this result, as well as disputing the district court's conclusion that because valid claims had not 
been presented, leave to amend to re-plead those claims was unmerited. Where leave to amend 
is sought, a valid claim must be presented; where a valid claim is not presented, denial is not an 
abuse of discretion. Black Cany9n Racquetball Club, 119 Idaho at 175, 804 P.2d at 904. 
Here, the district court correctly noted an absence of Idaho authority regarding whether, 
without express contractual assignment allowing such, an insurance company subrogee has 
standing to bring a statutory ICP A claim in the name of the insured subrogor. In the absence of 
controlling authority, a court may look to sister jurisdictions for insight. See Curlee v. Kootenai 
Count: Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (2008) ("When confronted with 
matters of first impression involving Idaho statutes, th[ e] Court may glean insight from the 
interpretations of sister states concerning similar ... statutes."). While this precise issue has yet 
to be addressed in Idaho, it has been addressed by Washington courts. 
In Trinity Universal Ins. Co. of Kan. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 176 Wash. App. 185, 312 
P.3d 976 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013), Trinity, an insurance company, defended and settled a personal 
injury claim against an insured. Trinity then brought suit against Ohio Casualty, another 
insurance company and co-insurer, for various claims, including violation of Washington's 
Consumer Protection Act, and subsequently obtained a default judgment. Trinity sought to 
enforce the default judgment, and on appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals held that Trinity 
could not recover on its consumer protection act claim because (1) the Washington Consumer 
Protection Act created a cause of action only for first-party claimants, (2) Trinity had not been 
expressly assigned those claims by the insured, and (3) Trinity-despite a broad "boilerplate" 
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subrogation clause in its insurance contract-was neither expressly subrogated under the relevant 
policy language nor subrogated to those claims under equitable principles. Id. at 201-05, 312 
P.3d at 985-87. 
In Washington, as in Idaho, there exist two types of subrogation: conventional and 
equitable. Conventional subrogation arises out of one person paying another's debt as the result 
of an agreement, express or clearly implied, that the payor will be subrogated to the rights of the 
payee. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 94 Idaho 489,492,491 P.2d 1261, 
1264 ( 1971 ). Equitable subrogation, by contrast, allows someone who has been required to 
satisfy a loss occasioned by a third party's wrongdoing "to step into the shoes of the loser and 
recover from the wrongdoer." Int'! Equip. Ser. v. Pocatello Indus. Park Co., 107 Idaho 1116, 
1119, 695 P.2d 1255, 1258 (1985). 
Despite Appellants' contention that "the doctrine of subrogation encompasses the 
complete substitution of the subrogor's rights in the subrogee," even under conventional 
subrogation an insurer's reliance on a policy's expansive boilerplate subrogation clause is not 
unlimited. Apps.' Br., p. 9. An insurer, as subrogee of the subrogor insured, may not bring a 
bad faith claim against other insurers. Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 132 
Idaho 318, 971 P.2d 1142 (1998). A landlord's fire insurance carrier may not maintain a 
subrogation action against a tenant for recovery of sums paid out for fire damage caused by the 
tenant's negligence. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Weisgerber, 115 Idaho 428, 767 P.2d 271 (1989). Nor 
may an insurer, as subrogee, recover criminal restitution from an offender, absent specific 
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statutory provision allowing such. State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 898 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 
1995) (superseded by statute, Idaho Code§ 19-5304(1)(e)(iv)). 
The Trinity court found that, as here, the subrogation language in the insurance contract 
did not expressly assign the CPA claim of the insured to Trinity, and so Trinity lacked standing 
to assert that claim under a theory of conventional subrogation.6 Id. at 203, 312 P.3d at 986. The 
court further held that Trinity was not equitably subrogated to the insured' s CPA claim because 
consumer protection act claims are statutory claims that belong to an insured, not an insurer. Id. 
As such, "[t]hey may be assigned, but they are not available to the insurer under equitable 
subrogation." Id. 
There, as here, the insurer relied on a boilerplate subrogation clause in the insurance 
policy for the proposition that any right to any payment springing from an insured's covered loss 
is automatically subrogated to the insurer. In determining that Trinity's subrogation clause did 
not apply, the Washington court found that because Trinity had "made no 'payments under this 
coverage' on any ... CPA claim in settling with [the insured]," but rather had paid a personal 
injury claim under its liability coverage, Trinity had no potential CPA damages to recover. Id. at 
203, 312 P.3d at 986. Likewise, here, Western Community paid out to DNJ for the fire loss of 
the Krone Chopper under the insurance policy in place, but did not pay out ICP A damages for 
which it could then seek recovery. 
6 The subrogation clauses at issue in the Trinity case and in the instant case are substantially similar. There, the 
clause read in pertinent part: "If the insured has rights to recover afl or part of any payment we have made under 
this Coverage Form, those rights are transferred to us." Trinity, 176 Wash. App. at 202, 312 P.3d 976 at 986. Here, 
the clause reads in pertinent part: "Transfer of Rights of Recovery Against Others to Us. If any person or 
, organization to or for whom we make payment under this coverage part has rights to recover damages from another, 
those rights are transferred to us to the extent of our payment." R. Vol. I, p. 59. 
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The Trinity comi likewise found that Trinity was not equitably subrogated to the 
insured's statutory CPA claims because "automatic equitable subrogation of primary insurers to 
the insureds' statutory rights would take from the insured the statutory damages to which they 
are entitled any time the insurer defends and indemnifies its insured," and that there was "no 
basis in the statutory language of the CPA ... or case law to justify doing so."7 Id. at 204-05, 
312 P.3d at 987. The same reasoning applies here. Western Community sought to bring ICPA 
claims against Burks and Krone as "alternative theories of recovery to the warranty claims" 
should those prove otherwise unrecoverable. Apps.' Br., 8-9. But simply because Western 
Community has indemnified DNJ for a fire loss does not mean that Western Community can 
take from DNJ the statutory rights under the ICPA to which DNJ may be entitled. If DNJ 
believed it had an ICPA claim arising out of the fire loss of the Krone Chopper, DNJ should have 
brought those claims within the time limits allowed by Idaho Code § 48-619. That Appellants 
chose not to, electing rather to bring these ICPA claims only in Western Community's name 
until such time that it became obvious that this would be unsuccessful, was a tactical decision the 
courts will not second-guess. 
5. Even if the district court erred in not allowing Western Community to allege 
ICPA claims in its proposed First Amended Complaint, any such error was 
harmless. 
On appeal, the Court will not reverse the district court if an alleged error is harmless. 
Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504, 95 P.3d 977, 986 (2004). In civil cases, 
7 The Trinity court declined to address whether public policy concerns should preclude assignment of CPA claims 
as part of an insurance agreement. Trinity, 176 Wash. App. at 202, 312 P.3d at 985. However, for statutory rights 
premised upon the protection of consumers from unscrupulous merchants, it would seem strange to allow automatic 
assignment of those rights to be written into adhesive insurance agreements. 
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 states that "[ a ]t every stage of the proceeding, the comi 
must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights." This Court 
has further held that "if an error did not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not 
affect the result of the trial, the error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Myers, 140 
Idaho at 504, 95 P.3d at 986; see Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 608, 726 
P.2d 706, 718 (1986). 
In its original Complaint Western Community alleged unfair and deceptive acts, in 
violation of Idaho Code§ 48-603(5) and -603(7), by Burks and Krone in the selling of the Krone 
Chopper and warranties to DNJ. R. Vol. I, pp. 23-25. The first ICPA claim alleged that Burks 
and Krone represented that the Krone Chopper and the warranties had characteristics, uses, or · 
benefits they did not; and alleged in the second ICPA claim that Burks and Krone represented 
that the Krone Chopper and warranties were of a particular standard, quality, or grade when they 
were of another. Id. These claims "were pled as alternative theories of recovery to the warranty 
claims .... " Apps.' Br., pp. 8-9. 
At trial, however, the jury returned a verdict against Appellants on all counts. Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 1096, LL. 3-20. The jury found, by way of special interrogatories, (1) that Krone did not 
breach the express terms of the New Equipment Limited Warranty, (2) that Krone did not breach 
the express terms of the Krone North America Crown Guarantee, (3) that Krone did not violate a 
duty of good faith with respect to the New Equipment Limited Warranty, and (4) that Krone did 
not violate a duty of good faith with respect to the Krone North America Crown Guarantee. Id. 
Because the jury found that there was no defect in the Krone Chopper to which the warranties 
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could apply-hence, no breach of the warranties-and no violation of the duty of good faith with 
respect to those warranties, any representation given-by Burks or Krone-as to either the 
"characteristics, uses, or benefits" or of the "particular standard, quality, or grade" could not 
have been unfair or deceptive as to trigger liability under Idaho Code § 48-603. 
While Appellants now assign error to the denial of their Motion for Leave to Amend as to 
re-plead dismissed ICPA claims, even if denial of the Motion was an error, the pleading of those 
I CPA claims would not have changed the jury's ultimate verdict. It could not have: the jury 
found that the conditions precedent to the triggering of the warranties never occurred. The re-
pleading of Western Community's dismissed "proposed claims under the ICPA ... pied as 
alternative theories of recovery" would have added no new factual issues for the jury to consider, 
only alternative legal bases to recover had the jury found the other way. Any such error could 
not have affected the result at trial, and as such any error was harmless and not grounds for 
reversal. Myers, 140 Idaho at 504, 95 P.3d at 986. 
B. The district court did not err in denying Appellants' motion for new trial. 
The district court did not err in denying Appellants' motion for new trial because the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in ( 1) deterniining that Burks had not asserted new 
factual and legal defenses regarding privity just before trial, (2) dismissing Burks on directed 
verdict because Burks was not a party to the Krone North America Crown Guarantee (Extended 
Warranty), and (3) denying Appellants' requested jury instructions regarding agency. 
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1. Standard of review 
A motion for new trial is governed by Idaho Rules o.f Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a).8 It 
states, in pertinent part, that: 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or 
any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against the law. 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. Any motion for a new trial based 
upon any of the grounds set forth in subdivisions 1, 2, 3 or 4 must be 
accompanied by an affidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon in 
support of such a motion for a new trial. Any motion based upon 
subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth the factual grounds therefor with 
particularity .... 
Former Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a). The burden of justifying a motion for new 
trial is on the moving party. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 773, 727 P.2d 1187, 1201 (1986). 
When reviewing an appeal of a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial under Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a), the Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Munns 
v. Sw[ft Transp. Co., '138 Idaho 108, 110, 58 P.3d 92, 94 (2002). "On appeal, the Supreme Court 
will not reverse a trial court's order granting or denying a motion for new trial unless the court 
has manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it." Id. The Court's test for determining 
8 Having be.en filed and ruled upon before the July 1, 2016 a.mendments to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Appellants' motion for new trial is governed under.former Rule 59(a), which, for our purposes, is not substantively 
different than the current Rule. In their briefing, Appellants cite Rule 15(a) for the governing Rule, but later provide 
the relevant text from Rule 59(a), and Burks takes the Rule 15(a) citation as scrivener's error. 
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whether a trial court has abused its discretion consists of three parts: "(1) whether the lower 
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Goodspeed v. 
Shippen, 154 Idaho 866, 869-70, 303 P.3d 225, 228-29 (2013) (quoting Schmechel v. Dille, 148 
Idaho 176, 179,219P.3d 1192, 1195 (2009)). 
2. The district court correctly perceived whether to grant or deny Appellants' 
motion for new trial was within its discretion. 
In its Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for New Trial, entered on June 24, 2016, the 
district court laid out the portions of Rule 59(a) relevant to its decision, as well as citation to 
authority for its recognition that such a decision is within the trial court's discretion. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 181-82. "The trial court's decision to grant a new trial is discretionary, and on appeal will be 
subject to the abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 181. The district court recognized that "[t]he 
court must set forth its reasoning for either granting or denying a motion for a new trial," and 
that "[i]n so doing, the court must distinguish between the various motions and grounds 
proffered by the moving party, and not lump them into a general grant or denial." Id. at 181-82. 
The trial court then did so, analyzing each issue raised by Western Community and DNJ. Id. at 
182-94.9 
9 Of note, Appellants have included in the Clerk's Record neither their Motion for Reconsideration and for New 
Trial, filed May 2, 2016, nor their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, also 
filed May 2, 2016. 
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3. The district court reached its decision to deny Appellants' motion for new 
trial by an exercise of reason. 
In denying Appellants' motion for new trial, the district comi issued its Order Denying 
Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial on June 13, 2016, 10 and its Memorandum 
Decision Re: Motion for Reconsideration and for New Triai, expiaining the district comi's 
reasoning, on June 23, 2016. R. Vol. I, p. 16. The district court's Memorandum Decision 
considers Appellants' motion at length, providing the procedural and factual .background, the 
Rule 59(a) standard, and the court's analysis of issues presented, finally concluding that the 
motion be denied. R. Vol. I, pp. 177-94. Throughout its analysis, the district court provided 
both a factual basis for its rulings as well as pertinent legal authority applied to those facts. Id. at 
182-94. Having done so, the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
4. The district court did not err in allowing Burks to assert the "new" factual 
and legal defense of lack of privity because Appellants themselves knew of 
Krone's ownership of the Krone Chopper when Appellants filed their Third 
Amended Complaint. 
Lack of privity of contract between DNJ and Burks was the basis for the district court's 
granting of a directed verdict in Burks' favor at the close of Appellants' case-in-chief. Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 800, L. 25-p. 802, L. 8. Appellants argue that the district court erred in allowing Burks to 
assert new factual and legal defenses regarding privity "just prior to trial" and then dismissing 
Burks on directed verdict. Apps.' Br., p. 11. Appellants contend: 
It was not until ... March 24, 2016 ... that Respondents advised Appellants and 
the district court that they had just discovered that Krone and not Burks was the 
10 Appellants have not included the district court's Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial in 
. the Clerk;s Record. "It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her 
claims on appeal. In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant's claims, we will not 
presume error." Hyde v. Fisher, 146 Idaho 782,786,203 P.3d 712, 716 (Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 
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owner of the Krone Chopper at the time of its sale to DNJ. This new fundamental 
factual assertion was first raised by Defendants [Krone and Burks] only twelve 
days before trial commenced on April 5, 2016. 
Apps.' Br., p. 12. Appellants further contend that Burks and Krone had asserted "throughout the 
discovery and pre-trial proceedings that Burks and not Krone was the owner of the Krone 
Chopper at the time it was sold to DNJ, and, therefore, it was Burks and not Krone that was in 
privity of contract with DNJ under the Warranties." Id. 
This is incorrect. Appellants, in their Third Amended Complaint served on Respondents 
December 15, 2015, and filed with the court December 17, 2015, expressly alleged that Krone-
and not Burks-was the owner of the Krone Chopper when it was sold to DNJ, factual 
allegations that were expressly admitted by Burks in Burks' Answer to the Third Amended 
Complaint, filed March 29, 2016. 11 See Apps.' Br., p. 11 ("Appellants' TAC was served on 
Defendants on December 15, 2015 .... "). Paragraph VIII of Appellants' Third Amended 
Complaint alleges: "On September 12, 2012, DNJ executed a Purchaser's Order for Equipment 
("Purchase Order") for the purchase of a 2012 Krone X 1100 Forage Chopper ("Krone 
Chopper"). The Krone Chopper was mamifactured and owned by Krone NA and was sold to 
DNJ on its behalf by Burks." R. Vol. I, p. 116 ( emphasis added). Paragraph IX of the Third 
Amended Complaint continues with, as a preface to further allegations: "At the time of its 
11 Appellants make much of the fact that Burks' Answer to the Third Amended Complaint was not filed within ten 
days of the Third Amended Complaint. Such argument is neither here nor there. Appellants' remedy in such 
circumstances would have been a motion for entry of default and default judgment under Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 55. Appellants never sought entry of default. Moreover, while Appellants have alleged that "the 
district court condoned Respondents' efforts to manipulate the evidence to their advantage" by "revers[ing] legal 
and factual possessions [sic] days before and at the first day of trial," Appellants have not assigned as error any 
violation of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(3) regarding "[a]ccident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against." Apps.' Br., p. 14. 
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purchase of the Krone Chopper ji-om Krone NA, Krone NA as the manufacturer/owner of the 
Krone Chopper .... " R. Vol. I, p. 117 ( emphasis added). 
In response to these factual allegations of Krone's ownership of the Krone Chopper at 
time of sale, Burks pled, in its Answer to the Third Amended Complaint, "With regard to 
Paragraph VIII of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, Burks admits each and every allegation 
contained therein." R. Vol. I, p. 137 [Burks Answer,~ 5]. Burks also acknowledged and agreed 
with the pertinent portion of Appellants' Paragraph IX: "With regard to Paragraphs IX and X of 
Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, Burks admits that Krone NA was the manufacturer/owner 
of the Krone Chopper .... " Id. [Burks Answer,~ 6]. 
Appellants argue extensively that a new trial was appropriate because this information 
about Krone's, rather than Burks', ownership of the Krone Chopper-the key fact defeating 
Appellants' privity of contract argument tying Burks to the remaining warranty claims-came 
out just before, and at, trial. Apps.' Br., 10-14. Appellants argue that "[t]his new fundamental 
factual assertion was first raised by Defendants only twelve days before trial commenced on 
April 5, 2016"; that on "the Wednesday of the week preceding the start of trial on Tuesday, April 
5, 2016" Burks asserted new defenses "based on the newly discovered evidence of ownership"; 
and that Burks was allowed to "controvert [its] previous factual assertions supporting privity on 
the eve of trial." Apps.' Br., 12-14. To the contrary, it is apparent from Appellants' own 
pleadings, as well as Burks' responses, that all parties knew the true ownership of the Krone · 
Chopper by, at least, December 15, 2015, when the Third Amended Complaint was served on 
Burks and Krone. Appellants can hardly argue an eve-of-trial surprise when they themselves 
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knew the key information at least three and a half months before trial, rather than the twelve days 
argued on appeal. 
5. The district court correctly recognized that Burks was not a party to the 
Extended Warranty. 
Appellants contend the district court erred in dismissing Burks on directed verdict on the 
grounds that Burks was not a party to the Extended Warranty. In doing so Appellants misread 
the Extended Warranty in an attempt to establish privity of contract between Burks and DNJ, at 
least insofar as it relates to the Extended Warranty. 
The parties to a contract are, at most basic, a promisor and a promisee. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 9 (1981). If a person neither gives nor receives a promise under a 
contract, that person is not a party to that contract. Here, Burks was not a party to the Extended 
Warranty because it was neither a promisor nor a promisee under the Extended Warranty. The 
purchaser of the Extended Warranty was DNJ, as the owner of the Krone Chopper to which the 
Extended Warranty applied. The provider issuing the Extended Warranty was Krone. 
A reading of the specific language identifying the parties in the Extended Warranty bears 
out this conclusion. The "Key Terms and Definitions" section stated, in pertinent part: 
CONTRACT: means this EQUIPMENT SERVICE CONTRACT. It is a 
CONTRACT between YOU and US. 
WE, US, OUR, DEALER, MANUFACTURER: means the Provider issuing this 
CONTRACT. 
YOU, YOUR, CONTRACT HOLDER: means the owner of the EQUIPMENT 
listed in the extended service contract certificate. 
R. Vol. I, p. 133. Appellants contend_ that this means that Krone was a guarantor, Burks the 
"Provider," and DNJ the "owner." Apps.' Br., p. 15. But such a reading produces a nonsensical 
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result. The contention that Krone was a mere guarantor is not borne out by the plain language of 
the contract, which makes no mention of any "guarantor." Also, Burks was not the "Provider 
issuing this CONTRACT." Krone, as the "MANUFACTURER," was the "Provider issuing this 
rnNTR ArT." 
A correct reading of the defined terms shows that the Extended Warranty is a contract 
"between you and us," with "you" being DNJ, the owner of the Krone Chopper after purchase 
from Krone; "us" being Krone, the dealer and manufacturer of the Krone Chopper as well as the 
provider of the Extended Warranty; and Burks not a party at all. This is reinforced by the fact 
that "Krone North America," "Krone NA," or "Krone" are listed nine times throughout the 
Extended Warranty, the proper name of which is "Krone North America Crown Guarantee." R. 
Vol. I, pp. 133-13 5. Burks is mentioned nowhere. 12 Id. 
Because the district comi correctly found that Burks was not a party to the Extended 
Warranty, it was not error of law for the district court to grant Burks' motion for a directed 
verdict. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' motion for 
new trial. Again, any alleged error is obviated by the fact that the jury ultimately found by 
special interrogatories that Krone did not breach either warranty, and that Krone did not violate 
the duty of good faith with respect to those warranties. 
12 Subsection "H." does seem to differentiate between "a dealer" and Krone .. This does not change the conclusion 
that Burks, proper, was never a party to the Extended Warranty. To hold so, despite the "Key Terms and 
Definitions" section, would necessarily lead to the absurd construction that any and every Krone dealership, 
anywhere in the world, was also a party to this pai1icular contract. 
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6. The district court correctly denied Appellants' agency jury instructions 
because agency was never pied and Appellants failed to comply with Rule 51 
in requesting the instructions. 
a. Appellants' proposed agency jury instructions were correctly denied 
because an agency theory was never pied. 
Appellants contend that the district court e1Ted in not instructing the jury that Krone was 
responsible for Burks' actions; that is, that it was eITor to deny Appellants' request, at trial, for 
agency instructions to be given to the jury. This denial was not e1Tor and thus does not 
necessitate a new trial. 
"On appeal, the review of jury instructions is generally limited to a determination of 
whether the instructions, when considered as a whole and not individually, fairly and adequately 
present the issues and state the applicable law." Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 13 7 
Idaho 173, 176, 45 P.3d 829, 832 (2002) (quoting Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 
330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999)). If they do, no reversible eITor is committed. Id. "Only 
instructions which are pertinent to the pleadings and the evidence should be given." Id. 
Here, Appellants never pled any allegation regarding agency. The Third Amended 
Complaint alleges no agency theory of liability and contains no instance of the word "agent" or 
"agency." R. Vol. I, pp. 115-24. Nor did Burks explicitly or implicitly consent to trial of any 
issues not pied; in fact, Burks specifically disclaimed any such attempt at trial. "[F]or the record, 
defendant Burks is not going to try an issue by express or implied consent under Rule 15 (b) of an 
unpled allegation or issue in the case." Tr. Vol. I, p. 96, LL. 3-7 (addressing another attempt to 
inject an unpled allegation). As the district court noted, "There was not a pleading of agency. I 
believe that [the] defense was, other than inferentially here as to this dealership agreement, fairly 
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adamant about allowing anything to go on beyond [or] outside of the scope of the pleadings." 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 988, L. 22-p. 989, L. 1. The pleadings did not put agency at issue, neither Burks 
nor Krone expressly or impliedly consented to trying agency, and as such the district court 
correctly denied Appellants' request to put agency instructions before the jury. 
b. Appellants failed to comply with Rule 51 in requesting the agency jury 
instructions. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51 ( a)(l) governs parties' requests for jury 
instructions. It states, in pertinent part: 
No later than five (5) days before the commencement of any trial by jury, 
any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in such request, and such requested instructions must be served upon and 
received by all parties at least five (5) days before the commencement of the trial. 
The court shall not be required to consider any requested instructions not filed and 
served upon the parties as required by this rule .... 
Former Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5l(a)(l) (emphasis added). 13 The court may 
"reasonably permit any party to file and serve written requests for instructions at any time up to 
and including the close of evidence at the trial," but only if they concern matters arising at trial 
"which could not reasonably have been anticipated" by the requesting party or which "were 
overlooked in the original requested instructions." Id. 
Appellants did not submit any proposed agency instructions "[n]o later than five (5) days 
before commencement of [the] trial by jury." Rather, they first did so on April 8, 2016, the 
fourth day of trial. Tr. Vol. I., p. 817, LL. 11-20. Nor did Appellants submit written 
instructions: while Appellants produce IDJI instructions now, on appeal, they did not do so 
13 The trial was held prior to the July I, 2016 amendments to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The current Rule 
51 (a) is more stringent, requiring service and filing of requested instructions no later than seven days prior to trial. 
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below. See Tr. Vol. I, p. 983, L. 19-p. 984, L. 4. While Appellants do contend in their briefing 
that evidence arose during the trial regarding an alleged agency relationship suggested by the 
Dealership Agreement and the testimony of Mr. Burks, Appellants do not allege that their 
proposed agency instructions "concern[ ed] matters arising during the trial of the action which 
could not reasonably have been anticipated," nor that their proposed instructions were ones 
"overlooked in the original requested instructions." Apps.' Br., p. 16; former Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 51 (a)(l) ( emphasis added). As such, Appellants have not shown that the 
district court abused its discretion in rejecting the proposed agency instructions. 
7. Even if the district court erred in denying Appellants' motion for new trial, 
such error was harmless. 
"This Court will not reverse the trial court if an alleged error is harmless." Myers v. 
Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504, 95 P.3d 977, 986 (2004); see Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 61 ("At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and 
defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights."). Here, even assuming arguendo that 
the district court erred in denying Appellants' motion for new trial on the basis of Burks' "new" 
factual and legal defenses, erred in dismissing Burks on directed verdict, or erred in its denial of 
Appellants' proposed agency instructions, such error did not affect Appellants' substantial rights, 
and thus is harmless. 
a. Any error based on Burks' "new" factual and legal defenses regarding 
privily of contract ·with DNJ did not affect Appellants' substantial rights. 
As discussed, Appellants in their own Third Amended Complaint acknowledged that 
Krone was the owner of the Krone Chopper when it was sold to DNJ and thus, there was no 
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privity of contract between Burks and DNJ. Appellant now contends that it was eITor to allow 
Burks to submit "new factual assertions and resulting legal defenses," that is, admit the fact of 
the Krone Chopper's true ownership, so close to trial. Apps.' Br., p. 14. 
Even if this constituted error, it could not have affected Appellants' substantial rights. 
Appellants contend that the assertion of the "newly discovered" fact that Burks never owned the 
Krone Chopper "unfairly prejudic[ed] Appellants' right to a fair trial." Apps.' Br., p. 14. This 
cannot be correct: while the right to a fair trial is enshrined in our system of justice, a party 
cannot complain of not receiving a fair trial simply because it was confronted with an 
inconvenient but true fact. More directly, a party does not have a substantial right to proceed on 
facts that it knows to be false. The search for truth and the just determination of proceedings 
demands otherwise. Because no substantial right of Appellants' was prejudiced, any error in 
refusing a new trial was harmless. 
b. Any error in dismissing Burks on directed verdict was harmless. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the district court erred in dismissing Burks 
on directed verdict, any such error was harmless because it could not have changed the outcome 
of the trial and thus could not have affected Appellants' substantial rights. As noted by the 
district court: 
The jury found that Krone had no liability under either the New Equipment 
[Limited] Warranty or the Extended Warranty. With respect to the Extended 
Warranty this verdict was a determination that 1) the damage was not caused by a 
mechanical breakdown or failure covered under the Extended Warranty, and/or 
that 2) the Extended Warranty was not in effect at the time of the incident. This 
verdict would have applied to Burks with equal force even if Burks had been a 
party to that contract. 
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R. Vol. I, p. 185 ( emphasis in original). Because the jury found that there was no liability under 
the Extended Warranty, even if the district court erred in dismissing Burks on directed verdict, 
any such error was harmless. 
Any error based on the district court's refusal to give agency instructions 
did not affect Appellants' substantial rights. 
"The appellant has the burden to clearly show prejudicial error from an erroneous jury 
instruction. An erroneous instruction is prejudicial when it could have or did affect the outcome 
of the trial." Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539,543, 164 P.3d 819,823 (2007) (internal citations 
omitted). 
At end of trial, the jury found by special interrogatories that Krone did not breach either 
warranty, and that Krone likewise did not violate the duty of good faith with respect to those 
warranties. Tr. Vol. I., p. 1096, LL. 3-25. To have given the jury Appellants' proposed agency 
instructions14-imputing the liability of Burks onto Krone-would be irrelevant where the jury 
found that there was no liability. It is Appellants' burden to show how such an instruction, even 
if mistakenly refused, could have or did affect the outcome of the trial; they have not done so, 
and so any such error was harmless. 
The district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to its choices in denying Appellants' motion for new trial.· The district 
court recognized that no "trial by ambush" occurred because Appellants' own Th~rd Amended 
14 Because Appellants did not serve or file their desired instructions with the district court, we have only those 
instructions Appellants orally presented. See Tr. Vol. I, p. 983, LL. 19-24 ("THE COURT: And so, what are you 
wanting me to tell them, that, define an agency, and then what? MR. LLOYD: And just state that a principal is 
liable for the actions of its agents within the scope of their agency."). 
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Complaint recognized that Krone owned the Krone Chopper at the time of sale to DNJ and thus 
Burks and DNJ were never in privity of contract. Because the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Appellants' motion for new trial, such denial was not error. 
C. Burks is entitled to its attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) affirmatively mandates that attorney fees shall be awarded in a 
civil action involving a commercial transaction: 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) (emphasis added). 
Whether there is a commercial transaction is a question of law over which the Court 
exercises free review. See Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,470, 
36 P.3d 218, 222 (2001 ). "Where a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a 
type embraced by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of[§ 12-120(3)] and a 
prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was established." 
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772 (1994). "This same principle 
applies where the action is one to recover in a commercial transaction, regardless of the proof 
that the commercial transaction alleged did, in fact, occur." Magic Lantern Prod v. Do/sot, 126 
Idaho 805, 808, 892 P.2d 480,483 (1995). Idaho courts will consider whether the parties alleged 
the application of Idaho Code § 12-120. See Fritts v. Liddle & ~Moeller Const., 144 Idaho 171, 
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174-75, 158 P.3d 947, 950-51 (2007) ("[both parties] m their answer and 
counterclaim ... clearly allege that I.C. § 12-120 applies."); Cannon Builders, Inc. v. Rice, 126 
Idaho 616, 624, 888 P.2d 790, 798 (Ct. App. 1995) ("the nature of the suit, which includes a 
claim that Crooks was entitled to enforce the Rice-Cannon contract as a third-party beneficiary, 
was sufficiently based on a commercial transaction .... "). 
In American West Enters., Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 316 P.3d 662 (2013), 
American West entered into an agreement with Pioneer in August 2007 to replace the engine in a 
Case New Holland (CNH) tractor which American West originally purchased in 1997. Pioneer 
was an authorized dealer of CNH. Pioneer ordered a new engine and core from CNH and 
installed the engine and core on American West's CNH tractor. In the two years following the 
installation of the new engine, the tractor was only used for fifteen hours. American West sold 
the CNH tractor to Frank Jensen in the spring of 2009. Jensen used the tractor for four or five 
hours before the engine stopped working. American West refunded Jensen the purchase price of 
the tractor and took it to Pioneer to diagnose the problem. Pioneer requested that CNH warrant 
the tractor engine. CNH refused to warrant the engine because the time limit on any warranty 
had expired. 
On March 18, 2011, American West filed a Complaint naming CNH as defendant and 
alleging breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 
American West demanded reimbursement for the cost of parts and labor. CNH answered and 
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that American West's claims were 
barred by a lack of privity between the parties. American West sought leave to amend its 
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complaint to include claims as a third-party beneficiary of an oral contract between CNH and 
Pioneer and that Pioneer was CNH' s agent. 
The district court granted CNH's motion for summary judgment and denied American 
\Vest's motion to amend the complaint. The district court found that privity of contract was 
required to recover for economic loss in a breach of an implied warranty case and that there was 
no privity between American West and CNH. The district court also found that American West 
was not the intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement between Pioneer and CNH and that 
American West failed to allege any facts indicating that Pioneer was the agent of CNH. The fact 
that Pioneer was an authorized dealer of CNH was not in and of itself sufficient to establish an 
agency relationship. The district court entered final judgment in favor of CNH and against 
American West. 
CNH requested attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ). The district 
court denied CNH's motion for attorney fees on the basis that it was unable to find a commercial 
transaction between CNH and American West. 
This Court reversed the district court's denial of attorney fees and held that, although 
CNH and American West did not deal directly with each other, American West alleged that CNH 
breached an implied warranty, which would be a commercial transaction. This Court "has made 
clear that the failure of a party's claims based on a commercial transaction does not absolve a 
party of the attorney fees and costs that would be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-120(3)." 
American West tried to recover on the commercial nature of a transaction: the breach of an 
implied warranty. It also sought to assert that it was a third-party beneficiary to the commercial 
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agreement between CNH and Pioneer. American West claimed it was entitled to attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because this was a commercial transaction. Although 
American West backtracked after CNH was found not liable on the alleged commercial 
transaction, that assertion triggered the application of Idaho Code § 12-120(3). CNH was 
entitled to attorney fees and costs below and on appeal. 
In the Third Amended Complaint, Appellants alleged breach of warranties claims against 
Burks, a commercial transaction, and requested an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3) because the alleged breach of warranties was a commercial transaction. 
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(l)(B), 54(e)(l), and 54(e)(5), as 
well as Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 41, Burks requests that the 
Court affirm Burks' award of attorney fees as the prevailing party below because an alleged 
commercial transaction between DNJ and Burks was the gravamen of and integral to the breach 
of express warranties claims and causes of action in the Third Amended Complaint. 
Accordingly, Burks requests that it be awarded attorney fees on appeal. Burks further requests 
an award of costs pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d) and Idaho Appellate 
Rules, Rule 40. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Western Community's motion for leave to amend was properly denied. because the 
previously dismissed ICPA claims Western Community sought to re-plead were not valid claims. 
Neither Western Community nor DNJ ever entered into a contractual relationship with Burks, 
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and thus Western Community never had standing (as subrogee or otherwise) to bring ICPA 
claims against Burks. Western Community was not subrogated to the time-barred ICPA claims 
of DNJ because such statutory consumer claims were not expressly assigned to Western 
Community and were not subrogated under equitable principles. Finally, even if the district 
court erred-it did not-any such error was harmless because at trial, the jury found that there 
was no defect in the Krone Chopper that would trigger application of the warranties, and without 
a defect, there could be no unfair or deceptive acts by Burks under the ICP A. 
Appellants' motion for new trial was properly denied because Burks had not asserted any 
new factual or legal defenses regarding privity of contract just before trial, Burks' motion for 
directed verdict at trial was properly granted, and because Appellants' requested agency 
instructions were properly denied. There was no irregularity in the proceedings, insufficiency of 
the evidence, or error in law that prevented Appellants from having a fair trial because the "new" 
information regarding Krone's-not Burks'-ownership of the Krone Chopper was alleged by 
Appellants themselves, months before trial, in their Third Amended Complaint. Burks' motion 
for directed verdict at the close of Appellants' case-in-chief was correctly granted because Burks 
was never a party to the Extended Warranty. The district court correctly denied Appellants' 
requested agency instructions because no agency theory or cause of action was pled in the 
proceedings, and neither Burks nor Krone expressly or impliedly consented to try any unpled 
issues; moreover, Appellants failed to comply with Jdal'fo Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51 in 
requesting the instructions. Finally, even if the district court erred-it did not-in denying 
Appellants' motion for new trial, any such error was harmless because the proposed remedy, 
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granting a new trial to be predicated upon facts known to be false, is antithetical to the just 
determination of proceedings. Further, any error based on Burks' dismissal on directed verdict 
or failure to give the jury the Appellants' requested agency instructions is likewise harmless, 
because the jury found that there v.;as no liability in this case, and thus any instructions regarding 
to whom liability should be imputed would be irrelevant. 
For the foregoing reasons, Burks respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district 
court's denial of Western Community's motion to amend its complaint, affirm the district court's 
denial of Appellants' motion for new trial, and award Burks its reasonable attorney fees and 
costs incurred on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of March, 2017. 
BRADY LAW, CHARTERED 
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